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Executive summary
Throughout this thesis we have presented a narrow overview of the research field of
structural credit models and their applicability to banks. We have focused on two of the
newer contributions to the field by Nagel and Purnanandam (2019)(NP) and Atreya, Mjøs
and Persson (2019)(AMP), and provided a thorough, but not exhaustive, comparison and
evaluation of these models.
We have found that the different approaches of the two models provide logical results
for both risk-neutral probability of default (RNPD)1 and credit spreads2, each displaying
strengths and weaknesses compared to the banking industry. Both models account for the
crucial characteristic of banks in that the value of their loans, and therefore their assets,
have a naturally capped upside. Accordingly, both models rely on the use of a standard
Brownian motion to describe the uncertainty of borrower asset values, and then value the
banks claim on these through their respective loans.
In our comparison we find that the NP model provides somewhat higher estimates for
both RNPD and credit spread relative to the AMP model for different borrower risk
parameters. We then discuss various characteristics and assumptions of both models as
explanatory for the observed deviation between the models. We also discuss whether each
of these characteristics appear realistic in light of the banking industry.
Lastly, we touch upon additional common deviations from the banking industry of
structural credit models like the ones we compare. Here we point to the complexity of loan
types, debt structure, bank income sources and bank’s borrowers as difficult elements to
incorporate in detail. Nonetheless, we argue that the models in focus presents reasonable
simplifications of the complex banking industry.
1See introduction for definition.
2See introduction for definition.
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11 Introduction
1.1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the great financial crisis of the 21st century, economists and regulators
across the globe have directed great emphasis on bank risks and their impact on financial
stability. On one hand, this has lead to meaningful critique of highly levered bank
structures and accompanying increased bank regulations such as the third Basel accords
(BIS, 2017). On the other hand, business executives have argued that leverage, as an
element of bank risk, is a natural part of the banking industry and claim that stricter
capital requirements will adversely affect economic growth (Gornall and Strebulaev, 2018).
The debate on bank risks and their impact on financial stability has also become an
emphasised subject in the academic field of risk measuring and its application to banks.
One such example is Keeley (1990), explaining high bank leverage as a result of moral
hazards. Another is DeAngelo and Stulz (2015) arguing that the bank’s role as a liquidity
provider explains the high bank leverage observed around the world. Unlike both of these,
Admati et al. (2013) concludes that high leverage is not necessary for banks in order to
perform their functions or operate efficiently, since bank equity is not socially expensive.
However, this paper represents a purely qualitative discussion of typical bank fallacies, and
does not specifically account for each of the banks stakeholders. Accordingly, Admati et al.
(2013) argued for a need for more quantitative models that may substantiate empirical
data.
At the same time, researchers have demonstrated meaningful progress in the field of
measuring credit risk and its application to banks. This research field consists of both 1)
model-based approaches, and 2) traditional approaches using historical data of defaults
(Toto, 2016). Looking at the model based approach, a line is drawn between structural3-
and reduced-form4 models. These approaches differ on their application of empirical
observations and their determination of default probabilities and the time of default
(Jarrow and Protter, 2004). In the past decades there has been a debate on which of these
3Structural models use the evolution of firms’ structural variables, such as asset and debt values, to
determine the time of default (Toto, 2016).
4In reduced-form models, default is treated as an unexpected event whose probability is governed by
a default-intensity process (Toto, 2016).
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model categories are better. However, as discussed by Wang (2009), both categories hold
certain pros and cons, implying that they may be appropriate for different applications,
supported by Toto (2016). Accordingly, increased accuracy of both these categories of
credit risk models have provided valuable information on various aspects regarding banks
such as capital structure, bank default probabilities, implications of financial regulations,
and much more.
In our thesis, we tackle the field of credit models for banks by looking exclusively at
structural credit models. We do so by comparing two of the more recent papers by
Nagel and Purnanandam (2019) and Atreya, Mjøs and Persson (2019). Despite significant
differences in their approach, these papers build on the evolution of the research field
going back to the option pricing scheme model of Merton (1974). Along the way, multiple
researchers have provided crucial insights to the applicability of such models to banks,
including Leland (1994), Dermine and Lajeri (2001) and Gornall and Strebulaev (2018)
amongst others.
In our comparison, we introduce estimates for the given parameters, based on empirical
data form the Norwegian financial sector. In Norway, banks and mortgage companies play
a crucial part in the economy, accounting for nearly 80% of the total credit to Norwegian
households and companies (Norges Bank, 2019a). This translates to nearly four times the
annual Norwegian state budget (Finansdepartementet, 2019). Furthermore, we find that
Norwegian banks are highly levered relative to average firms, with equity accounting for
only around 10% of the banks’ total balance sheet values (Finans Norge, 2019). This is
similar to what (Gornall and Strebulaev, 2018) found for US banks.
Our approach in comparing the two models includes their application to the modeling of
risk-neutral probability of default (RNPD)5 of a bank and corresponding credit spread6
under a given set of parameters. Furthermore, we structure our analysis to discuss the
differences displayed by the models, and compare these to what may appear reasonable in
the financial industry. Accordingly, the main issue of this thesis is to answer the following:
5The risk-neutral probability of default is the calculated probability of default under the assumption
that prices are calculated as their discounted expected values using risk-adjusted probabilities (Davis,
2017).
6Credit spreads are defined as the difference in yield between a corporate bond and a Treasury bond
(or similar estimate for risk-free rate) of the same maturity (Romo, 2014).
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What are the differences, and corresponding major strengths and weaknesses of the model
presented by Atreya,Mjøs and Persson (2019) compared to that of Nagel and Purnanandam
(2019)?
As our application of the models in comparison is rather narrow, we recognize that our
thesis paves the way for further use and evaluation of the models. Due to the models
being rather general, they are both applicable to multiple additional interesting topics
such as bank regulation and its consequences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theory behind the
models of comparison in addition to two of their key predecessors. In section 3, our choice
of parameters is discussed, while section 4 provides the methodology we have applied.
In section 5, our findings are illustrated and further discussed in section 6. Section 7
concludes.
1.2 Limitations
Due to the vast extent of literature on the subject of banks and their characteristics,
we have made certain limitations to our thesis to adequately answer the issue of topic
introduced. First, we have only taken into account structural credit models, and specifically
focused on two models in addition to their theoretical background.
Secondly, we have focus on their implications for banks RNPD and the accompanying
credit spread. As both models are general enough to be applied to a vast number of bank
elements, our analysis is therefore far from exhaustive in its evaluation of the models.
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In this section we introduce the theoretical foundation of our thesis. It includes 4 models
in their respective historical order as the latter two models are structured as modifications
of the prior ones. The following parts include a qualitative and technical introduction
to each of the models, illustrating why some of the adjustments have been critical to
evaluating banks in light of option pricing theory.
The first model, by Merton (1974), lay much of the foundation for this field of research.
Secondly, we present the adjustments made by Dermine and Lajeri (2001) which tackled
the issue of banks’ assets being constrained differently than other firms. The last two
models are far more recent to the research field, and provide the basis for this thesis’
findings and analysis, in which they are further compared and analyzed.
2.1 The Merton model (1974)
In May 1974, Robert C. Merton published a paper on the pricing of corporate debt,
focusing on the risk structure of interest rate. The paper introduces a model as an
extension of the Black and Scholes formula (1973), utilizing the insights from pricing
options to value the debt and equity of a firm. By holding the term structure in the model
given for most of his paper, Merton primarily focused on the impact of changes to the
firm’s probability of default on the price of debt and hence equity. The paper is structured
as a thorough mathematical derivation of his findings, including multiple examples of
application. However, as we merely utilize the conceptual insights of his findings, we
will in this section focus on the explanation, rather than the mathematical derivation of
Merton’s (1974) findings.
The Merton model includes a variety of assumptions and simplifications. It starts by
including the efficient markets hypothesis by Fama (1970) and Samuelson (1965) and the
Miller-Modigliani (1958) theorem of capital structure invariance. Furthermore, Merton
(1974) defines the asset value (Vt) of a firm as a “diffusion-type stochastic process”, implying
the firm asset value may drift in either direction at any point of time. This is given by
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dVt = (rVt − C)dt+ σVtdWt. (2.1)
Here, r is the continuous risk-free interest rate, C is the total payout by the firm to either
shareholders or creditors, dt represents the increment of time t, σ is the instantaneous
standard deviation of the return on the firm (volatility of firms asset value), and dWt is a
standard Gauss-Wiener process as a risk-neutral probability measure.
The fundamental insights of Merton (1974) then revolves around pricing the debt and
equity instruments of a firm with the asset process described above. This can be illustrated
with a simple balance sheet model of a firm as displayed below, where the firm is financed
with equity and one instrument of zero-coupon debt.
Assets Debt + Equity
At Dt = min(D¯, At)
Et = max(At − D¯, 0)
Here, the debt- (Dt) and equity (Et) time t values are determined by the asset value (At)
at the time of debt maturity and the face value of the debt given by D¯. If the asset
value is above the face value of debt at the time of debt maturity, the creditor of the firm
receive its respective face value D¯ and equity holders capture the remaining value of At.
However, if At < D¯, the creditor takes over the firm, and hence receives the remaining
value At, while equity holders receive zero.
In his paper, Merton (1974) discovered that the option theory provided by Black and
Scholes (1973) could be used to value the firm’s debt and equity at any point of time t
prior to debt maturity. First, looking at the firm’s equity, the relation described in the
table above represents the cash flow of a call option with the strike price equal to the face
value of debt. Accordingly, the shareholders may "exercise" their respective option on the
remaining value of the firm’s assets in cases where its value surpasses the face value of
debt at time of maturity. The price of this option then equals the equity value at any
point of time t.
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Secondly, the firm’s debt value can be rewritten as a function of the firm’s equity so that
Dt = D¯e
−rT −max(D¯ − At, 0). (2.2)
The first part of the equation is simply the discounted face value of debt to time t, where
r is defined earlier and T is the remaining time to maturity of the debt. However, the
latter part represents a put option on the firm’s value with the strike price equal to the
face value of the debt. Hence, the creditor receives its face value of debt less any potential
difference of D¯ − At in the case that At < D¯.
Merton (1974) assumed the options applied to be European of type, implying that they
may only be exercised at time of maturity. The equation for equity value is then given by
Et = AtΦ(d1)−De−rTΦ(d2), (2.3)
where
d1 =
lnAt
D
+ (r + σ
2
v
2
)T
σv
√
T
, (2.4)
and
d2 = d1 − σv
√
T . (2.5)
Here, Et, At, D, T and r are already defined. Furthermore, σv represents the standard
deviation of the equity (can be calculated from stock returns) and Φ() represents the
cumulative standard normal distribution. Applying the put-call-parity (Stoll, 1969), we
can calculate the put option value, and hence the debt value at time t.
The findings of Merton (1974) presented above allows for a pricing of equity and corporate
debt in a simplistic model of limited and observable variables at any given time t. The
paper goes on to further develop and apply the insight to risk structure of interest rates
as well as pricing of both preferred stock and callable bonds.
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2.2 Dermine and Lajeri (2001)
The Merton model was created without any specific company or industry as foundation.
Naturally, as different firms in different industries vary considerably in the types of assets
they hold, the model does not fit equally well across the board. In this sense, some
industries are in need of modifications to the Merton model of varying degrees to make
more sense. Banks in specific are part of this group, with a key issue being that the upside
potential of a bank’s assets is naturally capped. In 2001, Dermine and Lajeri published
a research note which explicitly looks at the lending risk of banks’ assets, effectively
accounting for this characteristic (Dermine and Lajeri, 2001).
The findings of Dermine and Lajeri are supported by simulation-based research from
Lucas (1995), McAllister and Mingo (1996) and CreditMetrics (1997) on loan portfolios.
In these studies, the authors find evidence of highly left-skewed distributions of the value
of loan portfolios due to correlation across defaults. The distributions are categorized by
a high probability for minimal changes in the value of the loan portfolio at the same time
as the tail is longer to the left with lower values. The left tail is explained by credit losses
during for instance recessions, where the loan losses can be considerable, while under
normal circumstances the interest and principal are reimbursed due to few loan defaults
(Dermine and Lajeri, 2001). Hence, their findings substantiate the modeling of a capped
upside for a bank.
Looking at traditional banks, the asset side is usually comprised of a majority of lending
to households and/or corporate borrowers. Taking Norwegian banks as an example, we
have looked at 10 years of empirical data on their balance sheet structure. Here, we find
that on average more than 72% of the banks’ assets comprised of loans to customers and
other credit institutions (SSB, 2019a). With assets primarily comprised of loans, the value
of a bank’s assets can not surpass the sum of the discounted face value of the loans and
their respective interest payments, in effect capping the upside valuation of the assets.
Similar to valuing the equity as a call option in the Merton model, Dermine and Lajeri
(2001) applies the option scheme in their own model, with the twist of introducing the
capped upside into the call option valuation. Their research note is centered around the
pricing of deposit insurance, but is nonetheless equally relevant for the evaluation of a
bank’s assets, debt and equity.
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The model of Dermine and Lajeri centers around one bank with one corporate borrower.
The borrower funds its assets (A) through a loan (L) from the bank in addition to equity
(Ef ), while the bank funds its assets (comprising of one loan and a deposit insurance (P ))
through deposits (D) and equity (Eb). Below the balance sheets of the borrower and the
bank are displayed:
Borrower:
Assets Debt + Equity
A L
Ef
Bank:
Assets Debt + Equity
L D
P Eb
Then, the research note goes on to present the market value of the bank’s equity in a
standard option style (Black and Scholes, 1973), as a call option on the bank’s assets:
MVe = Call(V alue of loan, D¯) = Call(L¯− Put(A, L¯), D¯)
Here, the Call and Put are defined by Black and Scholes (1973), while A is given by the
table above, and D¯ and L¯ represents the face values of the bank debt (D) and the loan
(L) respectively. As the assets consists of a loan and an insurance on deposits, the call
option representing the equity may be rewritten as a function of both parts. Here the
loan can be represented by the value of the loan at maturity less a put option due to the
fact that the borrower’s limited liability allows it to sell its assets A at maturity at the
price of L¯, in effect representing the bank taking over the borrowers’ assets in the case of
default. Applying the put-call-parity theorem (Stoll, 1969), the research note formulates
the value of the loan as
L = e−rT L¯− Put(A, L¯), (2.6)
where r represents the instantaneous risk-free rate and T the time to debt maturity. Here,
the bank’s assets equal the equity (call option) plus the discounted value of the exercise
price (D¯) less the liability of the deposit insurer (put option). Hence, we can rewrite the
market value of the bank equity as
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MVe = Call(L¯− Put(A, L¯), D¯)
= e−rT L¯− Put(A, L¯)− e−rT D¯ + Put(L¯− Put(A, L¯), D¯)
= L−D + Put(A, D¯).
(2.7)
Here, we see that the bank’s equity is bounded upwards by the value of the loan, less the
liability to the depositors in the case of a solvent borrower, while bounded downward by
the put received from the deposit insurer in the case of borrower default. Applying the
risk-neutral valuation methodology, the final valuation formula of equity value is given by
MVe = Call(A, D¯)− Call(A, L¯)
= AN(
lnA
D¯
+ (r + σ
2
2
)T
σ
√
T
)− e−rtD¯N( ln
A
D¯
+ (r − σ2
2
)T
σ
√
T
)
− AN( ln
A
L¯
+ (r + σ
2
2
)T
σ
√
T
) + e−rtL¯N(
lnA
L¯
+ (r − σ2
2
)T
σ
√
T
).
(2.8)
Here, N(.) represents the cumulative normal distribution and σ the instantaneous volatility
of the borrower asset value. This equation may be interpreted as a call on the asset value
of the borrower at the exercise price D¯, net of a call given to the borrower on the same
asset at the exercise price L¯. The latter two parts of the equation depicts the value loss
resulting from the capped upside. This is a decreasing value of the the loan repayments,
approaching zero as L goes to infinity.
2.3 Two more recent approaches
In recent years, multiple approaches to structural credit models of a bank has been
proposed with a variety of purposes. These include estimating the bank’s probability of
default, pricing deposit insurance, modeling the effect of the deposit insurance on bank
shareholders, optimizing the bank’s capital structure, and much more. In this section
we introduce two such structural models; the first exploring banks’ risk dynamics and
distance to default by Stefan Nagel and Amiyatosh Purnanandam (2019), and the second
seeking to optimize banks’ capital structure with regards to the shareholders interest by
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Nikhil Atreya, Aksel Mjøs and Svein-Arne Persson (2019).
2.3.1 Nagel and Purnanandam (2019)
In 2019, Nagel and Purnanandam (NP) provided their contribution to the field of evaluating
banks from an option perspective. Their paper presents a structural model for banks,
and focuses on the implications of specific bank assets characteristics to their default risk
and distance to default. Additionally, it provides quarterly empirical bank panel data
from 1987 to 2016, and discusses the pitfalls of the standard Merton model on bank risk
dynamics, government deposit guarantees and more (Nagel and Purnanandam, 2019).
The model presented in the paper is a modification of the Merton model, distinguished
by three central characteristics. First, the model assumes a log-normal distribution
for the borrowers assets over time, not the bank’s. Hence, the capped upside of the
bank is represented by its assets consisting of a pool of zero-coupon loans in which
the borrower assets comprise the loans’ respective collateral. Secondly, the loans are
modeled with staggered maturities such that a fraction of the loans mature each period.
Concurrently, the bank redistributes the payoff from the repaid loans to new loans under
equal characteristics. This implies that the loan-to-value ratio is reset with each maturing
loan as the new loan will be given at the same fixed initial loan-to-value ratio. Lastly, the
bank’s asset is modeled as a senior claim on the borrower assets.
With these characteristics, the model assumes a bank with a pool of loans constructed
in N cohorts (denoted by τ) in which the asset values (At) of each borrower (denoted i)
follows a log-normal process presented by the stochastic differential equation
dAτ,it
Aτ,it
= (r − δ)dt+ σ(√ρdWt +
√
1− ρdZτ,it ). (2.9)
Here, Wt and Zt are independent Brownian motions, δ is the depreciation rate, r is the
risk-free rate and σ is the instantaneous borrowers asset volatility. Moreover, t introduces
the time element, and dt represents the increment of time. The Zt process introduces the
idiosyncratic risk parameters, while ρ is included as the correlation of asset values due to
their common exposure to Wt.
Furthermore, the model introduces a fixed initial loan-to-value level l for all loans and an
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accompanying promised yield on the loans µ. Here, µ is endogenously solved for within
the model together with F1 being the face value of the first round of loans provided by
the bank. Then, a time to maturity for the loans is set in order to evaluate the assets of
the bank at a certain point of time t = T . At this point, the model first solves for the
aggregate borrower asset value of cohort τ given by
AτT−τ =
1
N
exp{(r − δ)T − 1
2
ρσ2T + σ
√
ρ(WT−τ −W−τ )}. (2.10)
Here, exp{x} represents the notation ex. Furthermore, NP defines the aggregate log asset
value as
aτT−τ =
1
N
[(r − δ)T − 1
2
σ2T + σ
√
ρ(WT−τ −W−τ)]. (2.11)
Here, the idiosyncratic risk is completely diversified away when assuming a continuum
of borrowers in each cohort. The stochastic component is therefore solely dependent on
the Brownian motions represented by WT−τ −W−τ . This is used to calculate the banks
payoff (L) from the loans of cohort τ at the given time, obtained by
LτT−τ (µ) =
1
N
[AτT−τΦ{d1(µ)}+ F1(µ)Φ{d2(µ)}], (2.12)
where
d1(µ) =
lnF1(µ)− aτT−τ√
1− ρ√Tσ −
√
1− ρ
√
Tσ, (2.13)
and
d2(µ) = − lnF1(µ)− a
τ
T−τ√
1− ρ√Tσ . (2.14)
In this equation, Φ represents the truncated log-normal distribution, with the standard
normal cumulative distribution functions d1 and d2. This implies that the idiosyncratic
risk of borrowers assets are present in the calculation of the banks payoff from individual
borrowers, given by the expression
√
1− ρ√Tσ in d1 and d2, despite being diversified
away in the aggregated borrower asset values.
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The model is then constructed so that the bank debt, also presented as a zero-coupon loan
debt, matures on a given date H with face value D. As some loans may have matured
by this date, the model introduces a recalibration effect in which the payoff from the
matured loans is immediately used for new loans to similar borrowers within each cohorts
at the same fixed loan-to-value ratio. Consequently, the model provides a new loan face
value (F2) from the initially found µ (same µ for all loans as they are given on equal
terms of borrower risk), and then calculates similar aggregate borrower asset values and
corresponding bank payoffs from the cohorts. Here, the model specifies the importance of
utilizing the new time horizons for the new loans, and its implied changes to the equations
presented above (for further explanation, see appendix A1).
From the set of equations presented above, we can calculate the bank’s asset value at a
given point of time t = H. This is simply done by discounting the bank’s payoffs from
the loans within each cohort to the specified time H so that
VH =
∑
τ<H
e−r(τ+T−H)EQH [L
τ
2T−τ ] +
∑
τ≥H
e−r(τ−H)EQH [L
τ
T−τ ], (2.15)
where EQH [.] denotes a conditional expectation under the risk-neutral measure at the time
of bank debt maturity. In the equation above, the only source of stochastic variation is
given by the Brownian motion Wt. Hence, applying a reasonable set of parameters (r, σ,
δ, ρ, T , τ , N and H), NP (2019) provides a set of 10,000 simulations of Wt. These are
then applied to illustrate the distribution of VH under the risk-neutral measure.
Now, we may introduce different capital structures and illustrate both the banks ability
to repay its debt, and the corresponding equity values. In order to make the model more
realistic, NP (2019) further introduces single payment dividends (YH) to the banks equity
holders, given by
YH = VH(1− e−γH). (2.16)
Here, γ is defined as the payout level, and the payments are modeled to be paid out just
before maturity. Furthermore, the model presents its equity (SH) and debt (BH) values
by
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SH = max[VH − YH −D, 0], (2.17)
and
BH = VH − YH − SH . (2.18)
We have adapted the NP (2019) model in Excel to illustrate the distribution of the balance
sheet values in the following figures. We start by running a set of 10 000 simulations of a
Brownian motion for each period the bank provides loans. We then calculate the value of
the promised payment on loans (µ) and its corresponding face value of loans (F1) (see
Methodology section for further explanation). Then, we calculate the aggregate borrower
asset values at loan maturity for each cohort (see equation 2.10) with their respective
aggregate log asset values (see equation 2.11), some of which have been rolled over from
their first round of loans. Furthermore, we calculate the bank’s respective payoffs from
each cohort (see equation 2.12), and discount these values back to the time of maturity
for the banks debt (see equation 2.15). At this point, we can illustrate the distributions of
the balance sheet values for a given capital structure, as displayed in the following figures.
Here we have applied the parameters in accordance with the original paper by NP (2019).
Hence, the parameters are set at N = 10, H = 5, T = 10, σ = 0.2, ρ = 0.5, r = 0.01,
δ = 0.005, l = 0.66, γ = 0.002 and D = 0.70. Correspondingly, the first cohort of loans is
assumed to be given at t = −9, implying that the loans in some cohorts are rolled over
into new loans by the time of the banks’ debt maturity. Furthermore, we have made a
model adjustment compared to NP(2019)(see the first part of the Methodology section
for further explanation).
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Figure 2.1: Simulated bank asset values
Figure 2.2: Simulated bank equity values
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Figure 2.3: Simulated bank debt values
Figure 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3: Illustrates the simulated 1) bank asset, 2) equity and 3) debt
values at bank maturity (H = 5) as a function of aggregate borrower asset values 7. The
figures are based on 10 000 simulations. Each simulated value corresponds to a dot in the
figures.
From the graphs above we can point out some important findings of the models nature.
First, there is a clear concavity to both the bank’s asset- and equity values. This is mainly
driven by the staggered maturities of the loans implying that many loans are not matured
at the time t = H. Secondly, this may also be driven by the idiosyncratic risk of the
individual loans, increasing the borrowers’ default option value and thereby reducing the
bank’s value of the loans.
Another point of notice is the clear dispersion in the bank’s asset value despite the
aggregate borrower asset value. This may also be driven by the staggered maturities of the
loans. In cases where borrower asset values perform poorly until the maturity of the first
few cohorts, the number of defaults may be significant and the corresponding aggregate
payoffs from the loans will be low. Thereby the value of the new loans of the bank will be
low. As a result, the banks asset value at time t = H will be reduced, despite a scenario
7Aggregate borrower asset value is the total collateral value of the borrowers within all cohorts at
their respective time of loan maturity, discounted to the time of the banks debt maturity.
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with strong improvement in borrower asset values up until the time of loan maturity, due
to the loans capped upside.
In the remaining part of NP’s (2019) paper, they compare and visualize the difference
of their model and that of Merton (1974), in addition to including an empirical point
of view as mentioned earlier. Here, the paper illustrates the pitfall of Merton (1974) in
underestimating the asset volatility of a bank in situations of shocks to borrower asset
volatility due to the fixed asset volatility of the Merton model. For further elaboration,
see appendix A1 or the paper included in the reference list.
2.3.2 Atreya, Mjøs and Persson (2019)
In the Fall of 2019, Atreya, Mjøs and Persson (AMP) provided their working paper on
banks’ capital structure in a shareholder perspective. The paper presents a structural
model illustrating why shareholders are better of with close to 100% leverage in a bank
in cases of reasonable parameter assumptions. The paper further provides illustrative
examples of the effect of interest rate shocks to optimal bank leverage amongst other
elements (Atreya et al., 2019).
The model presented by AMP (2019) represents a set of modifications of the Leland (1994)
and Merton (1974) models. It starts by defining a bank which only provides asset-backed
loans to a single borrower at a time. It then explicitly defines the loans to customers and
the bank’s debt as perpetual coupon paying instruments, excluding the characteristics of
a fixed maturity. Then the paper strategically provides the model’s structure, starting
with the borrower.
At the borrower level, taxes and bankruptcy costs are disregarded, due to the focus on
the bank’s optimal capital structure. The model then specifies the borrower asset value
(At) so that
dAt
At
= rdt+ σdWt, (2.19)
where σ is the constant borrower asset volatility and Wt is a standard Brownian motion.
dt represents the increment of time. Due to the assumption of continuous coupon paying
loans, r represents the constant continuously compounded risk-free rate of return.
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In the AMP model, the bank’s borrowers finance their assets at a given fixed loan-to-value
ratio 0 < L < 1. Hence, given a constant A0, the borrower selects a loan value Bˆ so that
its initial leverage at loan origination is given by
L =
Bˆ
A0
. (2.20)
For the given loan size, the borrower defaults on its loan at the time when its asset value
(At) reaches the threshold value A¯, also representing the value the bank recovers in the
event of borrower default. The value of the loan is expressed as a function of both the
borrower’s asset value and the threshold value
B(At) =
cBˆ
r
− (cBˆ
r
− A¯)(At
A¯
)−γ, (2.21)
where
γ =
2r
σ2
> 0, (2.22)
and c represents the continuous coupon payment on the borrower loan. The last element
of the loan value expression above represents a security yielding 1 in the event of borrower
default. Denoted by its time t price, we have that
Gt = (
At
A¯
)−γ. (2.23)
Here, the process takes values in the interval (0, 1] for values of At > A¯. Applying Ito’s
lemma, it can be shown that the process of Gt, like the process At, is a geometric Brownian
motion. Using Gt, we find that the initial borrower defaults at time t when Gt = 1 and
At = A¯. The threshold value is here determined endogenously in the model for a given
value of debt (Bˆ) and coupon rate (c). This determination is based on Black and Cox
(1976) so that
A¯ = ΨBˆ, (2.24)
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where
Ψ =
c
r
γ
1 + γ
< 1 (2.25)
is the factor multiplied by the face value of borrower debt to determine the borrower’s
optimal default threshold. Utilizing the findings above, we can now calculate the initial
value of G and the corresponding coupon rate c from
G = G0 = (LΨ)
γ (2.26)
and
c
r
(1− G
γ + 1
) = 1. (2.27)
Next, the model provides the characteristics of the bank. At this point, the paper
postpones the introduction of capital market frictions until the final part of optimization.
The bank is here presented with only one borrower at a time, so that when the borrower
defaults, the bank issues its recovered amount into a new loan at equal borrower terms
such as an equal and constant asset volatility (σ) and initial leverage (L). With the
borrowers denoted by j, the recovered amount of A¯j equals the face value amount of the
next borrower, so that
Bˆj+1 = A¯j = BΨj, (2.28)
for all j ≥ 1 and where Bˆ1 = B. The relation between the bank and borrower can be
illustrated by their respective balance sheets:
Borrower j balance sheet
Ajt D
j
t = B(A
j
t)
Ejt = A
j
t −Djt
Bank balance sheet
Bt = D
j
t Dt(B)
Et(B) = Bt −Dt(B)
Furthermore, the model proceeds to generalize the process of the bank’s asset values
when the first borrower defaults. This is done by returning to the defined process Gt in a
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rewritten manner
Gt = Ge
σγYt , (2.29)
where Yt represents Gt expressed as a Brownian motion (for elaborated calculations, please
see appendix A2). Drawing on the findings of Merton (1974), AMP (2019) further defines
d =
1
σγ
ln(
1
G
) (2.30)
as the borrowers’ normalized distance to default. This is by assumption the same at loan
origination for all the bank’s future borrowers. Extending these findings to a case where a
borrower default results in a new loan to a new borrower, we have that when the default
time of the bank’s borrower number n = 1, 2, . . .
τ(n) = inf{t ≥ 0 : Gt = 1
Gn−1
} = inf{t ≥ 0 : Yt = n · d}. (2.31)
Here, Yt counts the number of normalized distances to default and inf represents the
abbreviation of infimum 8. By defining the number of defaults up to time t by Nt as
Nt = bηt
d
c, (2.32)
where
ηt = sup
0<s<t
Ys. (2.33)
Here, the notation bxc represents the greatest integer less than or equal to x (Graham
et al., 1994), while sup represents the abbreviation of supremum 9. We can further
calculate the state price of all the bank’s future borrowers at time t in terms of Nt and Yt,
given by
8Infimum is the largest quantity that is less than or equal to each of a given set or subset of quantities
(Lexico, 2019).
9Supremum is the smallest quantity that is greater than or equal to each of a given set or subset of
quantities (Lexico, 2019).
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Πt = Ge
σγ(Yt−Ntd). (2.34)
It can be graphically shown that whenever Πt reaches 1, this indicates a borrower default
and will automatically reset Πt to the next borrower of the bank. By now, we can solve
for the bank’s asset value (Bt) in a frictionless scenario, given by
Bt =
c
r
BΨNt(1− Πt
γ + 1
). (2.35)
Introducing the element of capital structure, the model defines F as the face value of debt
and i as the continuous interest rate paid on the bank’s debt. The problem of solving
for the debt and equity components in such a scenario has been studied extensively, and
bases its solution on the number of borrower defaults. This is solved by
n∗ = d ln(iF )− ln(cB)
lnΨ
e, (2.36)
in which the notation dxe represents the least integer greater than or equal to x (Graham
et al., 1994), and i is simultaneously solved for by its definition
i = r(
1− (GΨ)n
∗
LB
1−Gn∗ ), (2.37)
where LB is the initial leverage ratio of the bank. The equity of the bank can then be
calculated as
E(B) = sup
τ
E[
∫ τ
0
(cBΨNt − iF )e−rtdt], (2.38)
and by defining τ as τ(n∗) using the definiton of τ from equation 2.31, we solve the equity
E(B) = B − { iF
r
− (iF
r
− B¯∗)Gn∗}, (2.39)
where
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B¯∗ = BΨn
∗
. (2.40)
The paper goes on introducing standard capital market frictions of taxation (θ) and
bankruptcy cost (α) at the bank level, holding the borrowers clear of the bankruptcy
cost. Accordingly, the bank’s after-tax income is given by cBΨNt and the bank’s interest
payments on debt are now θiF . Additionally, the cost of bankruptcy is given by αB¯,
where B¯ represents the bank’s default threshold. For the optimization in the model, the
bank’s enterprise value is the sum of its assets and the trade-off between the frictions
introduced, where the latter is maximized. This is defined as
V (n¯) = B +X(n¯), (2.41)
where the trade-off function is given by
X(n¯) = T (n¯)− C(n¯) = θiF
r
(1−Gn¯)− αB(ΨG)n¯. (2.42)
Combining the findings above, AMP presents the optimal value of equity for the
shareholders as
Ef (B) = B − {(1− θ)iF
r
− ((1− θ)iF
r
− B¯∗f )Gn
∗
f}, (2.43)
where
n∗f = d
ln[(1− θ)iF ]− ln(cB)
lnΨ
e, (2.44)
and
B¯∗f = BΨ
n∗f . (2.45)
The last part of the model is the optimization of the trade-off value to maximize the
bank’s value. As the trade-off benefit increases with iF due to the tax advantage, we set
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it to its maximum value for a given n∗f . We then have to account for the fact that the
optimal number of borrower defaults is limited to the natural numbers, denoted n∗ ∈ N.
Hence, the optimization is a discrete problem. This is approached by solving the trade-off
function for the integers below and above the real positive number of borrower defaults,
denoted t ∈ R+. This gives us the trade-off function
X(t) =
θ
r
cBΨt−1
(1− θ) (1−G
t)− αB(ΨG)t = BΨt(θK(1−Gt)− αGt). (2.46)
The optimal number of borrower defaults is then set at the integer found above, which
provides the greatest value of the trade-off function, given by
n∗ = bt∗c+ 1{X}, (2.47)
where
t∗ =
θKlnΨ
(θK+α)ln(ΨG)
lnG
, (2.48)
and
1{X} =
 1 ifX(bt∗c) > Xdt∗e)0 otherwise. (2.49)
Finally, the paper defines the bank’s enterprise value (V (B)∗) including capital market
frictions as a function of the equations presented. This is given by
V (B)∗ = B +
θ(iF )∗
r
(1−Gn∗)− αB(ΨG)n∗ = B +X(n∗). (2.50)
The model can then be visualized on multiple parameters. In the paper, AMP (2019)
focus on the impact of variation in the borrowers leverage and borrower asset volatility as
risk parameters for the bank. In Figure 2.4, the optimal bank leverage as a function of
these borrower risk parameters is illustrated.
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Figure 2.4: Bank leverage vs. borrower risk parameters
Figure 2.4: The optimal bank leverage for different borrower risk parameters (σ and L).
r = 2%, θ = 27%, α = 22% and B = 100.
Figure 2.4 depicts bank leverage of nearly 100% as optimal for shareholders in a large
part of what can be considered as reasonable levels of both borrower leverage and asset
volatility. Once the borrower leverage grows, the figure becomes discontinuous with
stepwise moves in the optimal level of bank leverage. This is explained by the relation
between the bank interest rate (i) on its debt and the borrower risk parameters. At certain
points of borrower leverage, the bank will adapt its debt structure and i will change,
due to the calculation of n∗ (equation 2.37). The paper goes on to discuss the following
implications of the figure above, such as for regulatory interventions, coupon payments,
optimal number of borrower defaults and more.
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3 Choice of parameters
In this section we introduce the parameters applied in the following sections of the thesis to
the models of NP and AMP. Some parameters will be treated as variables to analyse their
impact on the models, while those introduced here are based on empirical observations and
rational discussion in light of the current situation in the Norwegian financial sector. We
note that the parameters regarding time horizon are fixed rather arbitrarily in accordance
with NP (2019), something we discuss further in the analysis section.
3.1 Common input parameters in both models
Besides the parameters treated as variables in the approach in the following sections, there
are two parameters that are treated as given constants in both models; risk-free rate (r)
and the bank leverage ratio.
Looking at the risk-free rate, we find 10-year Norwegian government bond yields to be
a decent indicator for Norwegian banks. During the course of preparing this thesis, we
have observed that these yields have been ranging mostly between 1-1.5% by late 2019
(Norges Bank, 2019b). However, due to the current state of a demographic shift in the
Norwegian population, combined with slightly lower growth expectations, the yields are
expected to remain low (Carvalho et al., 2017)(IMF, 2019). We therefore argue that r =
0.01 is a conservatively fair level.
Considering the parameter of bank leverage, we have looked at the historical leverage
ratio 10 of Norwegian banks (Finans Norge, 2019). However, this ratio includes some
off-balance sheet items in the denominator, implying that the ratio is artificially low for
a pure balance sheet driven model. Hence, we have also looked at historical balance
sheet values for Norwegian banks 11, and found that the banks on average operated with
approximately 90% book leverage (Finans Norge, 2019).
10The leverage ratio consists of core capital, and the exposure target includes all capitalized items and
off-balance sheet items calculated without risk weighting (Finanstilsynet, 2017).
11We have excluded foreign branches here, as they may be affected by deviating capital requirements
in the respective home countries.
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3.2 Specific parameters of the NP model
In addition to the parameters included in both models, the NP model incorporates a
borrower asset correlation (ρ), a bank asset depreciation rate (δ) and a bank payout level
(γ). Due to lack of relevant Norwegian figures, we have continued with the parameters
provided in the NP paper of ρ = 0.5, δ = 0.005 and γ = 0.02.
3.3 Specific parameters of the AMP model
Due to the inclusion of financial market frictions, the AMP model also incorporates two
new parameters: income tax (θ) and bankruptcy cost (α). In their paper they base these
figures on empirical observations from US banks of θ = 0.27 and α = 0.22. With regards to
the tax rate, we have looked at 10 years of empirical data on Norwegian banks, providing
an average rate of θ = 0.24 (SSB, 2019b). However, concerning the bankruptcy cost, there
is little to no relevant recent empirical data from the Norwegian banking sector. Hence,
we have continued with the estimate provided by AMP (2019).
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4 Methodology
In this section we explain our application of the NP and AMP models presented in the
theory section as well as the steps to our findings.
4.1 Simulations and adjustments of the NP model
In this section we first present some minor adjustments to the NP model used in our
application before discussing our approach to simulations and further calculations within
the model. For this model we have utilized Excel to provide the figures in the following
Findings section.
4.1.1 Model adjustments
In our application of the NP model we have made an adjustment to certain expressions due
to our understanding of a potential error in the original version. The adjustment regards
the use of (1/N) in equations 2.10 and 2.12 in the theory section. To our understanding,
applying this part of the expression both when calculating the aggregate borrower asset
and the payoff from a cohort will double the normalization needed when having multiple
cohorts. Hence, we have disregarded this effect up until the calculation of the banks asset
value. This implies that displaying the aggregate borrower asset value or payoff from a
specific cohort independently would be misleading as these are not yet adjusted for the
total number of cohorts within the bank.
4.1.2 Time to maturity and number of cohorts
Similar to NP (2019), our results are based on maturities staggered across 10 cohorts of
borrowers, bank debt maturity of 5 years and the bank issuance of zero-coupon loans with
maturity of 10 years. In figure 4.1, we have illustrated the 10 cohorts and their respective
maturities used to estimate the bank asset value at t = H. Each line represent the 10-year
loans of a cohort, while the dotted line illustrates the time of the bank’s debt maturity.
Furthermore, the time frame begins at t = -9 due to an assumption of the first cohort’s
initial loan maturity at time 1.
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Figure 4.1: Staggered cohorts
Figure 4.1: Illustration of the 10 cohorts and their respective maturities used to estimate
the bank asset value at t = H. Parameters: N = 10, T = 10, H = 5.
As we can see from figure 4.1, the cohorts mature at different times. At the maturity
date of the bank debt (t = 5), cohort 1, 2, 3 and 4 have already been rolled over into new
loans, illustrated with an additional line in the figure. Cohort 5 matures at the same time
as the banks’ debt, while cohort 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 matures in the periods following.
4.1.3 Simulating the standard Brownian motion of the model
In the NP model, the Brownian motion Wt depicts the only stochastic variation to the
determination of the aggregate borrower asset values of the respective cohorts. Hence, this
is also the only stochastic variation to the final calculation of the bank asset value. To
provide the distribution of both the balance sheet values and risk parameters of the bank,
we have therefore calculated a set of 10 000 simulations of the process Wt, consistent with
the approach of NP.
Approaching the simulations, we have applied the Excel command of
NORMSINV(RAND()), providing the inverse of a standard cumulative distribution with
E(x) = 0 and σ = 1. The RAND() function then returns a random number 0 < x < 1.
We then set W0 = 0. Furtermore, the approach is adjusted for the time intervals so that
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Wt+1 = NORMSINV(RAND()) + Wt, implying that the process evolves over time as a
standard Brownian motion. Running a set of 10 000 simulations, we find the distribution
of 10 000 bank asset values, and may thereby evaluate parameters such as asset volatility,
RNPD and credit spreads. In order to assign a RNPD and credit spread to different
combinations of borrower leverage and volatility, we have run 10 000 simulations for each
pair of different borrower leverage and borrower volatilities (yielding a total of 1 000 000
simulations) and estimated the bank asset value and volatility, borrower asset value,
RNPD and credit spread based on the arithmetic average for values from each set of
simulations.
4.1.4 Further calculations
4.1.4.1 Endogenously solving for µ and F
As introduced in the presentation of NP (2019) in the theory section, the promised yield
on loans (µ) and the face value of initial loans (F1) provided by the bank are solved for
endogenously in the NP model. The approach here relies on the insight that the initial
borrower leverage can be modeled as the present face value F1(µ) less a Black-Scholes put
option. As the initial borrower leverage is a defined constant within the model, and F1 is
a function of µ, this can be utilized to solve for µ and F1.
In our approach to the NP model, we incorporate the findings above into the Goal Seek
function of Excel. Filling in a standard Black-Scholes put, F1 as a function of µ and the
equation of borrower leverage (see Appendix A.1) as a function of F1(µ) and the put, we
then Goal Seek the latter cell to the given value of borrower leverage we want, by changing
µ only. This returns the promised yield on loans (µ) and its respective face value (F1).
When executing this exercise, we noted that the starting value set in the cell in which
borrower leverage was calculated had a slight impact on the final value of µ. Though the
practical impact of the effect was nearly unnoticeable, it should be recognized as a minor
weakness of utilizing the Excel function of Goal Seek in this application.
4.1.4.2 RNPD- and credit spread calculations
In our calculations of RNPD and credit spread we have assumed a fixed bank leverage at
time 0, allowing for the variation of the borrower risk parameters. This fixation is done
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under the assumption that the bank’s assets consist solely of the loans provided to 10
cohorts at time 0, the first being provided at time t =-9. We then discount the respective
face values of the loans to time 0. Furthermore, we allow the size of bank debt to fluctuate
under various combinations of borrower risk parameters so that its discounted time 0
value, divided by the time 0 asset value, remains a constant (leverage) ratio. This is done
by the use of Excel’s Goal Seek command for each set of borrower risk parameters.
In the process of calculating the RNPD we turn to the appendix of the NP (2019) paper.
Here, they introduce the function
RNPD = Φ(
−ln(Vt) + ln(D)− (r − γ − 12σ2)(T − t)
σ
√
T − t ). (4.1)
Here, Φ() represents the standard cumulative distribution function, Vt the bank’s asset
value and D the bank’s face value of debt. σ is the bank asset volatility and is found by
calculating the standard deviation of the distribution of bank asset values given by the set
of simulations. Lastly, the remaining parameters are as presented in the theory section.
In the following sections we also evaluate the credit spread on bank debt in the NP model.
The credit spread is here defined in accordance with the paper as RNPD multiplied by
the loss given default (LGD). Hence, we can write the credit spread as
Credit spread = RNPD · LGD, (4.2)
where LGD is given by
LGD = 1−min[VH
F
, 1]. (4.3)
In accordance with NP (Nagel and Purnanandam, 2019), RNPD is provided by equation
4.1, while LGD is calculated as 1 less the recovery rate. We define the recovery rate as
the minimum of the discounted asset value (VH) divided by the face value of debt and 1,
utilizing the distributions of the bank’s asset values from simulations. We then calculate
the average credit spread within each set of 10 000 simulations, obtaining a single credit
spread estimate for each set of the chosen parameters in the model.
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4.2 Application of the AMP model
In this section we discuss our application of the AMP model to evaluate bank RNPD and
the credit spread of its debt. For this model we have utilized Maple to provide the figures
in the following Findings section.
4.2.1 RNPD calculations
In the sections below we introduce further calculations on the basis of the AMP model.
Due to AMP (2019) including the element of financial market frictions (referred to as
frictions) within their model, we have provided separate illustrations to account for the
effect of such frictions in comparison with the NP model.
4.2.1.1 RNPD - without frictions
In the calculations of AMP’s RNPD without frictions, we utilize the models frictionless
definition of the optimal number of borrower defaults (n∗ from 2.36) and bank default
threshold (B¯∗ from 2.40). In this case, n∗ is dependent on both the face value of the
bank’s debt (F ) and the interest (i) on the respective debt. Here, i is again dependent
on n∗, implying the need for simultaneously solving for both parameters. This is done
through a process which start with an arbitrary value for i, and then gradually adjusts the
value of i until it simultaneously solves both equations. This can be done both in Excel
through the use of the Goal Seek function, or in Maple (which we utilize) by writing the
process as a procedure. Here, the bank leverage ratio is given by LB = FB . Hence, fixing
both F and B allows us to implicitly fix the initial bank leverage under the assumption
that the bank debt is issued at par.
Furthermore, we apply the standard results (see Harrison (1985) or Lando (2004)) for
Brownian motions in the process of calculating RNPD. Defining mt as the minimum value
of the bank’s asset upon time t, the probability Q(mt < B¯) can be written as Q(ηt >
n¯∗d). Both the distribution of ηt and d are known from the theory section. n¯ is however
defined by
n¯ = n(B¯) = m¯+ 1− ln(G¯)
ln(G)
, (4.4)
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where
G¯ = (γ + 1)(1− r
c
B¯
BΨm¯
), (4.5)
and
m¯ = m(B¯) = b ln(B¯)− ln(B)
ln(Ψ)
c. (4.6)
From Harrison (1985) or Lando (2004), the function of Q() gives us the RNPD from the
AMP model, where Q() is defined by
Q(τ > t) = Φ(
x0 − µt√
t
)− e2µx0Φ(−x0 − µt√
t
), (4.7)
where
x0 = n¯
∗d, (4.8)
and
µ = (
r
σγ
)− σγ
2
. (4.9)
4.2.1.2 RNPD - with frictions
Similar steps as described above are applied in the calculation including capital market
frictions. However, including capital market frictions slightly changes the calculation of
the bank debt interest rate (i) and face value (F ). Due to the inclusion of frictions, we
apply the n∗ (equation 2.47) given by t∗ and X(t) (equation 2.46). These results are
then applied in equation 2.50, optimizing the bank enterprise value. As the effect of
frictions allow for a greater enterprise value of the bank, driven by the tax advantage less
bankruptcy cost in the X(t) equation, the bank leverage ratio is calculated as
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LB =
F
VB
, (4.10)
where VB is given by equation 2.50. A fixed initial bank leverage LB and n∗ is then
applied to calculate the bank debt interest rate given by equation 2.37. We then solve for
the optimal number of borrower defaults including frictions and the bank debt interest
rate, given by equation 2.44. The remaining process of calculating the RNPD of the bank
under various borrower risk parameters (borrower asset volatility and borrower leverage)
then follows the same process as described for the case without capital market frictions.
4.2.2 Credit spread calculations
In the calculation of credit spreads from the AMP model we define the credit spread as
the continuous interest i paid on the bank debt less the risk-free rate r. Hence, we have
utilized the same line of equations presented in the section on RNPD above. Here we
define the interest rate i along the way, both with and without capital market frictions.
The last steps in order to calculate the credit spread is then simply to subtract the risk-free
interest rate, and then adjust the rate from its continuous characteristics to an annual
rate, so that it is comparable with the results from the NP model. The latter is here done
by
credit spreadannualized = e
(icontinuous−r) − 1. (4.11)
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5 Findings
In this section we have applied the models of NP and AMP presented in the theory
section, accompanied with the adjustments, extensions and additions presented in the
methodology section. We visualize both models’ evaluation of a bank’s RNPD, and the
accompanying credit spread under various borrower risk parameters. In this section we
only provide a brief introduction to the findings, while in the following section of analysis
we elaborate on their explanations.
A key element to note in this section is that the AMP model appears to display elements
of discontinuity in the following figures. This is explained by the relation between the
bank interest rate (i) on its debt and the borrower risk parameters. At certain points
of borrower leverage, the bank will adapt its debt structure and i will change, due to
the calculation of n∗ (equation 2.37). However, as we have fixed the initial level of bank
leverage in this section, the entire effect will materialize in a lower i, for certain levels of
borrower leverage. As a result, increased borrower leverage may in some regions contribute
to a decline in both RNPD and credit spreads, despite being considered a risk parameter
of the bank, due to a decline in i.
Another point of notice is that the figures illustrating the NP model are based on a 10x10
grid of point observations, implying that some sharp edges within the illustrations may be
due to a limited set of observations. In comparison, those of the AMP model are based
on a 49x49 grid. This difference is due to the use of Excel for the NP model, while Maple
is used for the AMP model.
5.1 Risk-neutral probability of default
In figure 5.1 below, we have illustrated the RNPD of the NP model. Here, the parameters
are set to N = 10, H = 5, T = 10, ρ = 0.5, r = 0.01, δ = 0.005, γ = 0.002, while we let
borrower asset volatility (σ) and borrower leverage (l) vary. The model excludes the effect
of capital market frictions, and is fixed at an initial bank leverage ratio of 0.9.
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Figure 5.1: NP - RNPD
Figure 5.1: NP model with RNPD for different borrower risk parameters (σ,l).
From the figure 5.1, we see that both parameters of borrower risk have extensive impact
on the default probability of the bank. Especially for cases in which one of the parameters
approach 1, even incremental increases from the starting point of zero for the other risk
parameter leads to RNPD jumping towards 1.
In figure 5.2, we have illustrated the RNPD of the AMP model excluding frictions. Here,
the parameters are set to r = 0.01, B = 100, T = 5 and F = 90, while we let borrower
asset volatility (σ) and borrower leverage (L) vary. The fixture of B and F implies an
initial bank leverage of 0.9, corresponding to the same value as the NP figure above.
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Figure 5.2: AMP - RNPD (no frictions)
Figure 5.2: The AMP model without frictions’ estimates of RNPD as a function of
borrower risk (σ and L).
In figure 5.2 above, we find similar results as the NP model in which large values of σ
and L yields a RNPD moving towards 1. However, the impact of increasing borrower
risk parameters appear to have a slightly less adverse effect on the RNPD of the bank,
compared to the NP model. Also, the figure displays an element of discontinuity in the
upper interval of borrower leverage, as discussed in the beginning of this section.
Lastly, we have included an illustration of the AMP model including frictions in figure
5.3. The figure shows clear similarities to the model of no frictions, though it displays
a somewhat lower upper limit to RNPD. Also here we find elements of discontinuity as
discussed earlier in this section.
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Figure 5.3: AMP - RNPD (frictions)
Figure 5.3: The AMP model with frictions’ estimates of RNPD as a function of borrower
risk (σ and L).
Below we have summarized the findings on RNPD in a table of results for different values
of borrower risk parameters. The table illustrates that the NP model provides remarkably
higher values of RNPD in the mid region of borrower risk parameters, while converges in
the end points. This is in line with what we observe from the previous figures. Note that
the discussion on discontinuity for the AMP model (see beginning of the Findings section)
affects the results here.
Table 5.1: RNPD estimates
Input NP AMP - no frictions AMP - frictions
σ = 0.1, leverage = 0.3 0.00 0.00 0.00
σ = 0.2, leverage = 0.4 0.15 0.00 0.00
σ = 0.4, leverage = 0.6 0.79 0.25 0.25
σ = 0.6, leverage = 0.8 0.97 0.75 0.44
σ = 0.7, leverage = 0.9 1.00 0.89 0.75
Table 5.1:Displays estimates for RNPD under the two models for various set of borrower
risk parameter inputs.
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5.2 Credit spreads on bank debt
In figure 5.4 below, we have illustrated the bank’s credit spread under the NP model, and
we have applied the exact same input parameters as under the RNPD section above.
Figure 5.4: NP - Credit Spread
Figure 5.4: Credit spreads on bank debt interests estimated with the NP model for
different borrower risk parameters (σ and l).
In figure 5.4, we find a clear pattern of increasing credit spread for higher borrower risk
parameters as expected. However, the steepness of the surface is substantial, yielding a
credit spread of almost 1 (100%) for the maximum displayed values of the risk parameters.
Also, it appears that increases to borrower asset volatility have a greater impact to credit
spreads at low levels, compared to that of borrower leverage.
In figure 5.5, we have illustrated the bank’s credit spread under the AMP model without
frictions, and we have applied the exact same input parameters as under the RNPD
section.
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Figure 5.5: AMP - Credit spread (no frictions)
Figure 5.5:Credit spreads on bank debt interests estimated with the AMP model without
frictions for different borrower risk parameters (σ and L).
Interestingly, figure 5.5 displays a credit spread that merely reaches slightly below 0.4,
compared to nearly 1 in the NP model. Nonetheless, we find similar trends in development
along the axis, despite borrower volatility appearing to induce a more convex impact on
the credit spread in this model, compared to prior figures.
Lastly, we have also exhibited a version of the AMP model including capital market
frictions in figure 5.6. Here, we find that the credit spread evolves to a slightly lower upper
limit, as expected. The discontinuity is clearly more present when including frictions,
though the overall trend appears fairly similar to the model without frictions.
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Figure 5.6: AMP - Credit spread (frictions)
Figure 5.6:Credit spreads on bank debt interests estimated with the AMP model with
frictions for different borrower risk parameters (σ and L).
Below we have summarized the findings on credit spreads in a table of results for different
values of borrower risk parameters. The table illustrates that the NP model provides
vastly higher values of credit spreads as the borrower risk parameters increases, as the
previous figures illustrate. Note that the discussion on discontinuity for the AMP model
(see beginning of the Findings section) affects the results here.
Table 5.2: Credit spread estimates
Input NP AMP - no frictions AMP - frictions
σ = 0.1, leverage = 0.3 0.00 0.00 0.00
σ = 0.2, leverage = 0.4 0.01 0.00 0.00
σ = 0.4, leverage = 0.6 0.32 0.03 0.02
σ = 0.6, leverage = 0.8 0.82 0.09 0.07
σ = 0.7, leverage = 0.9 0.96 0.13 0.11
Table 5.2:Displays estimates (in %) for credit spreads under the two models for various
set of borrower risk parameter inputs.
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6 Analysis
In this section we discuss the differences between the two models presented by Nagel and
Purnanandam (2019) and Atreya, Mjøs and Persson (2019). The discussion is comprised
of two parts. First, we analyse the results shown in the previous section, emphasising
the models output on RNPD and credit spreads. Secondly, we will discuss potential
disconnections of the models to the banking industry that are not covered in the first part.
6.1 Analyzing RNPD and credit spreads
6.1.1 Simulation versus optimization
As presented in the theory section, the models incorporate two fundamentally different
mathematical methods in order to estimate the RNPD and credit spread. Our application
of the AMP’s model includes an element of optimization in its estimate of the RNPD
and credit spread as explained in the theory section, while the NP model’s estimates are
based on 10 000 simulation runs. As these methods have different effects on the results
presented in the findings section, we briefly discuss their implications below.
The figures in the findings section indicates that there exists meaningful difference in
the estimates of the models, especially the credit spread estimates at higher borrower
risk (and the RNPD calculations at borrower leverage and volatility in the mid-section).
An explanation of the significantly lower results from the AMP model compared to NP
may be that AMP is based on optimizing the number of borrower defaults under certain
constraints, hence we receive the RNPD and credit spread only for optimal solutions. On
the other hand, simulations take a greater spectre of values into account in order to look
at the performance of a system. Hence, it is reasonable to expect some deviance in the
results to be driven by the use of these different methods.
Furthermore, we expect the variation in values under simulation to be highest in the
mid-section compared to values estimated close to the endpoint of borrower asset and
borrower volatility. This is due to to the capped volatility of the simulated values near the
endpoints as the RNPD cannot become greater than one or less than zero. This means
that the distance between the estimates from the simulation and optimization should
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converge close to the endpoints of borrower leverage and volatility compared to the middle
layer. This is exactly the case for the RNPD figures.
For the credit spreads the estimates from both models converges towards zero based on
the assumption that the risk-free rate is always lower than or equal to the rate of risky
bonds. Nonetheless, in practice, the credit spreads can become negative under very special
scenarios like during the financial crisis were Bhanot and Guo (2011) found evidence of
negative credit spreads on three occasions on an American Express bond.
Further, another question is whether 10 000 simulations in the NP model are enough in
accordance with the central limit theorem (CLT), which is necessary in order to provide
reasonable estimates of the model. The CLT states that the distribution of a sample
converges towards the true population parameter with increasing sample size. Often a
sample size of 30 or more is sufficient in order for the CLT to hold (Ganti, 2019). In figure
6.1, the probability density function for various numbers of simulations are illustrated.
Figure 6.1: Simulation distributions
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Figure 6.1: Illustrates the distributions from 100, 1 000, 10 000 and 100 000 simulation
runs. Like NP, we use 10 000 simulation runs.
As we can see from the figures, the probability density function (PDF) based on 100
simulations is far from symmetrical. However, the PDF becomes increasingly symmetrical
with a greater number of simulations. With 1000 simulations, the PDF is not perfectly
symmetrical, but has improved meaningfully compared to 100 simulations. In accordance
with the NP (2019), the use of 10 000 simulations appears to be a sufficient number
of simulations based on the PDF, which is not far from perfectly symmetrical. As we
can see from figure 6.1, the symmetry does not change much between 10 000 and 100
000 simulations, hence 10 000 simulations appears to be an appropriate number for
precision. This is substantiated by Ritter et al. (2001), who argues that when iterations
are inexpensive, running 10 000 simulations is satisfactory due to stable estimates.
6.1.2 Differences in time horizon
The two models presented in the findings section have an inherently different way of
incorporating the element of time. While NP (2019) defines the lending and debt of the
bank as bonds with a given year of maturity, AMP (2019) assumes that both the lending
and debt of the bank are perpetual contracts.
Banks, like other firms tend to operate with a given time to maturity for both their debt,
and the loans they provide. However, banks also typically prefers a stable capital structure
with the intention of providing business for an indefinite time. Hence, the NP model is
only appropriate in the evaluation of a given limited time horizon, while the AMP model
is also suited for an indefinite time horizon. This might seem rather negligible at first
sight, but for models that are intended to represent banks in general, this implies that an
argument must be made for what is a reasonable event horizon in the NP model. As this
may be difficult to define for general banks, an arbitrary time t in the model may severely
impact its results.
For illustrative purposes we have exemplified the effect in figure 6.2 for RNPD, showing
that different time horizons have significant impact on RNPD for equal risk parameters.
Here, the parameters are set equal to those used in the theory section. From the figures
we can see that increasing the time to loan maturity (T ) leads to increased RNPD, all
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else equal.
Figure 6.2: Effect of time on RNPD (NP model)
Figure 6.2: Illustrates the effect of different borrower loan maturities on RNPD. N = 10
and H = 5 is held constant, while T varies among the various lines.
In the figures of RNPD in the findings section the issue of time is solved endogenously
(see Harrison (1985) or Lando (2004)), allowing for the specification of time in the AMP
model. Hence, the calculations of RNPD are done under the same time horizon for both
models.
The case is however different for the computation of credit spreads. Here, the AMP model
is fundamentally based on a perpetual time horizon for all loans and debt, implying that
fixing a time of maturity for bank debt is a rather complicated matter. Our approach,
as described in the method section is to convert the continuous credit spread provided
by the AMP model to an annualized rate. However, as this rate is calculated without a
specific point of maturity for the bank debt, it is not entirely comparable to the results
from the NP model. Hence, some of the deviation between the two models’ respective
credits spreads may be due to the issue of time horizon.
Another important issue is related to the effect of a limited time horizon in the NP model.
Despite the downside of an arbitrary time to maturity as discussed above, it has an
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important impact on the collateral of a loan held by the bank. In the AMP model, the
bank only issues new loans in the event of a borrower default. Hence, a long period of
positive borrower asset evolution would imply that the collateral related to the bank’s
loan would accumulate accordingly. This is depicted in figure 6.3 in which we look at a
case of a meaningful borrower asset value growth over a period of 30 years, found by trial
and error for σ = 0.2.
In a typical bank, loans will at some point of time be repaid and the bank will reissue
their respective payoff. Hence, accumulated collateral of such a loan will be reset to that
of the initial borrower leverage ratio. For a long sustained period of borrower asset value
growth as in figure 6.3, this will not be accounted for in the AMP model. However, the
fixed time to maturity in the NP model captures this effect, as depicted in figure 6.3.
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Figure 6.3: Borrower asset value as collateral
Figure 6.3: Illustrates the borrower asset value and its role as collateral for a loan in a
period of positive borrower asset value evolution. The blue line displays the development
of borrower 1 for the AMP model, while the orange and green lines display two additional
borrowers for the NP model. The doted line at value 1 is the defined initial value of
borrower assets in both models. The solid black lines demonstrate that the loans in the
NP model are repaid and redistributed to new loans every 10 years as we set T = 10. The
arrows on the right hand side illustrates the collateral (above initial level) in period 30.
Here, we see that as the loan reaches its maturity (set to T = 10), the bank captures
its payoff, and then reissues a loan at equal initial parameters (here we have set the
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initial borrower asset value to 112). In effect, the accumulated collateral may become
unrealistically large in the AMP model in cases of sustained borrower asset value growth,
as depicted by the arrows on the right hand side of the graphs in figure 6.3 (in addition to
the collateral from the initial borrower leverage), which are considerably larger for AMP.
As a result, the AMP model may underestimate the realistic risk of loan losses in such
periods due to the artificially high collateral that follows. Accordingly, this characteristic
contributes to explaining the lower observations of both RNPD and credit spreads for the
AMP model in the findings section.
6.1.3 Zero-coupon- versus continuous coupon bonds
Another element of difference to the models concerns their assumptions on coupon
payments. The loans and debt of the bank in the NP model are structured as zero-coupon
bonds, implying that all the income and costs regarding the bonds are present in their
respective face values. In the AMP model, they are structured with a continuous coupon
or interest accompanying their lack of maturity. However, in the banking industry, lending
and debt primarily consists of loans with coupon or interest payments (Lindquist et al.,
2016). Taking the Norwegian financial sector as an example, banks’ debt mainly consists
of customer deposits and covered bonds, both heavily dependent on their interest/coupon
payments (SSB, 2019a). Hence, the AMP approach appears the more realistic one.
One major implication of the different assumptions regarding the coupon payments above
is that the bank’s asset value becomes the only driver of default in the NP model. As
the model excludes periodical coupon payments, the bank may only default on its debt
at the time of maturity. This is a rather improbable implication of the model’s coupon
assumptions in light of the financial sector. Fluctuations in the ability to pay interest
on debt may in fact be a crucial indicator of bank defaults, regardless of the time to
maturity of its debt. This element is at least to some degree captured in the AMP model
as it endogenously calculates the number of borrower defaults that optimizes the bank’s
enterprise value on the basis of the calculated coupon payments from borrowers, affecting
the interest paid on the bank’s debt and the bank’s optimal time of default.
12This is a simplification as the payoff from borrower 1 would imply a larger loan to borrower 2 (and
the payoff from both 1 and 2 leads to a larger loan to borrower 3) and hence a greater initial borrower
asset value for borrower 2 and 3 for a fixed initial borrower leverage ratio. Nonetheless, the insight from
the example holds.
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The same argument holds for the borrower asset process. In the NP model, borrowers
may only default at the time of their respective maturity, compared to borrowers in the
AMP model defaulting as their asset value reaches their calculated threshold value, which
depends directly on their coupon payments. The implications of this observation are
severe, and may be illustrated by a simplified example as in figure 6.4. Here, we have
mapped a standard Brownian motion with annual volatility of 20%, representing the
evolution of borrower asset value, starting at the value 1. Setting the NP time of maturity
to T = 10, we look at the bank’s loss given a weak borrower asset evolution. The key
takeaway is that the bank under the NP model will lose the entire difference between the
borrower asset value at the time of maturity and the face value of the loan (set to 0.7),
given by the arrow at the right hand side. However, under the AMP model, the borrower
will default the first time its asset value breaches the threshold value (also set to 0.7).
The bank will then redistribute the recaptured amount into a new loan to a borrower at
the same initial borrower leverage ratio. Hence, the bank will recapture the safety from
collateral at the fixed initial leverage ratio, ensuring that it loses no more than that of the
first default during the given time period for this example. As a result, the loss of the
bank under the AMP model becomes significantly lower than under the NP model, which
is reflected in a lower RNPD and credit spread in the findings section.
However, the argument also goes the other way, as the case may be made where the AMP
model would reflect a loss from a borrower default, while the NP model does not, should
i.e. the borrowers asset value increase substantially in the last few years of the example.
Nonetheless, the example illustrates how the loss potential for a given time period is
significantly larger under the NP model.
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Figure 6.4: Borrower asset value and default
Figure 6.4: Illustrates the borrower asset value and default threshold in NP and AMP
over time. The blue line displays the development of borrower 1. The doted line at
value 0.7 is the default threshold in AMP and face value of loan in NP. The solid line
demonstrates the time of default in AMP, while the orange line is the asset value of the
new borrower after default. In NP, the borrowers default first at T = 10, hence the bank
loss is higher compared to AMP due to the negative development in borrower asset value.
Looking at the figures on credit spread for AMP and NP in the findings section, this
argument appears to bode well with the observed differences. Especially, as borrower asset
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volatility increases, the NP model displays signs of concavity for credit spread, compared
to convexity for the AMP model. This may partly be explained by the characteristics
described in the example above, greatly increasing the bank’s downside risk under the NP
model compared to the AMP model, especially as borrower asset volatility increases.
6.1.4 Capital market frictions in the AMP model
The AMP model in its complete form includes parameters for capital market frictions of
income tax and bankruptcy cost, as opposed to the NP model assuming perfect capital
markets. From a practical point of view, this makes the AMP model more realistic as
there are hardly any banks escaping such frictions in the real world. However, as NP lacks
such parameters, our findings section provides two versions of the AMP model; with and
without frictions.
A key implication of introducing capital market frictions to the AMP model is that the
bank’s initial enterprise value may surpass its initial asset value denoted by its initial
loan to a borrower. This is due to the trade-off function given by X(t) (equation 2.46)
which optimizes the difference between increased enterprise value from tax benefits less
the bankruptcy cost. Hence, the bank may withstand a greater number of borrower
defaults before defaulting on its own debt for a given set of risk parameters. This is in
fact what the findings appear to illustrate, as the RNPD and credit spread for a given
set of parameters mostly trends lower for the AMP model including financial market
frictions compared to the one that does not. It is here important to note that the model’s
technicalities responsible for the areas of discontinuity changes somewhat when including
frictions, largely explaining what appears to be areas of deviation from this argument.
6.1.5 Number of borrowers
The two models provide quite different borrower structures for a bank. In the NP model,
the bank provides loans to an unspecified number of borrowers divided into a set of cohorts,
capturing the effects of diversification in the banking industry. In contrast, the AMP
model operates with a more simplified model with only one borrower at a time. From an
industry perspective, the approach of NP (2019) is here more realistic.
One of the main implications of a multiple borrower structure is that the asset values of
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the borrowers are typically not perfectly correlated. Hence, if a group of borrowers default
due to weak asset performance, others may perform better, reducing the negative impact
on the bank’s payoff from defaults. Despite this effect being lost in the AMP model with
only one borrower at a time, this may partly be captured by applying a somewhat lower
estimate of borrower asset volatility in the model.
6.2 Further deviations from the banking industry
As discussed in the prior analysis, both the models of NP (2019) and AMP (2019)
display strengths and weaknesses in comparison with each other and the banking industry.
However, there are some points of criticism left out of the discussion so far. These are not
unique for the models analysed in this thesis, but rather general for this field of research,
due to the complexity of accounting for an increasing number of bank characteristics in a
structural model.
One such point of notice is the vast number of types of loans in the financial sector. In
practice, loans can be provided with and without collateral, with varying maturities, with
floating interest rates pegged to external factors, to vastly different borrowers, etc. These
characteristics are extremely complicated to model specifically, hence explaining the need
for simplifying assumptions such as a common volatility estimate and exclusively modeling
loans with collateral.
Another point of notice is the variation in debt structures found in banks across the world.
As discussed previously in the analysis, Norwegian banks utilize deposits and covered
bonds as their primary source of debt funding (SSB, 2019a). The models could here have
adapted a branched debt structure to incorporate the complexity of the banking industry
such as Sundaresan and Wang (2014). However, it may be argued that similarities of
these debt securities should limit the potential disadvantage of simplifying the debt as a
single type of instrument such as the models analyzed in this thesis.
A potentially larger deviance from the banking industry is that the income stream tends
to stem from far more than one source. Taking Norwegian banks as an example, the last
10-years of empirical data depicts almost 25% of income as derived from other sources
than interest income (SSB, 2019b). Other income sources may here include provisional
income, financial market activities, dividend income from subsidiaries, insurance business,
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etc. Hence, the simplification of a bank where its only business regards asset backed loans
may disregard important elements of typical banks, which could have meaningful impact
on aspects of bank evaluation.
Last, but not least, geographical presence of a bank may have considerable implications
for what are deemed realistic input parameters. I.e. a large number of smaller Norwegian
banks are only narrowly present in a geographical sense, implying that regional economic
factors may dictate vastly different values of borrower asset correlation (ρ) and asset
volatility (σ), compared to larger banks (Cook, 2019). However, as the models analyzed
above are focused on general banks, this effect is left unaccounted for.
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7 Conclusion
Throughout our thesis we have presented a narrow overview of the research field of
structural credit models and their applicability to banks. We have focused on two of the
newer contributions to the field by Nagel and Purnanandam (2019) and Atreya, Mjøs and
Persson (2019), and provided a thorough, but not exhaustive, comparison and evaluation
of these models.
In our work, we have put meaningful emphasis on the objectivity of our evaluation,
especially due to our supervisor being among the authors of the AMP model. We have
therefore approached our analysis from strictly theoretical and empirical view, based on
the results we have found in combination with our accumulated knowledge of banks.
We have found that the different approaches of the two models provide similarly logical
results for both RNPD and credit spreads, each displaying strengths and weaknesses
compared to the banking industry. Both models account for the crucial characteristic
of banks in that the value of their loans, and therefore their assets, have a naturally
capped upside. Accordingly, both models rely on the use of a standard Brownian motion
to describe the uncertainty of borrower asset values, before valuing the banks claim on
these through their respective loans.
The NP model adapts the bank characteristics of multiple borrowers of which their assets
are not perfectly correlated. It also provides an arguably sufficient number of simulations
of its borrower asset processes, providing a reasonable estimate for the asset volatility of
the bank. As the model operates with a given time to maturity for both loans to borrowers
and bank debt, it appears well suited to evaluate any single bank in which duration for
loans and debt maturity are given. Nonetheless, its assumption of loans and bank debt as
zero-coupon bonds is a clear deviation from typical bank practice. Combined with a fixed
time horizon, this has meaningful impact on the modeled bank loss from borrower defaults
due to the bank lacking the ability to capture its claim on collateral at the moment the
borrower first becomes insolvent. However, the fixed time horizon also implies a periodical
reset of collateral, which corresponds to limited time horizon of any single loan.
The AMP model structures the respective loans and debt of a bank as continuously paying
bonds without a given maturity, hence avoiding the issues of fixed time, but disregarding
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the effect of periodically reset collateral. It also incorporates capital market frictions,
which are both realistic and relevant to banks across the world. As the model utilizes
optimization, it disregards the need for a bank asset volatility estimate, implying that the
bank actively chooses its optimal point of default. Hence, the model is well suited in its
application to a generalized bank, and may therefore be argued to fit regulatory purposes
that are encompassing the majority of the banking industry. Nonetheless, also the AMP
model displays some weakness, such as relying on a single borrower at a time. This choice
of model structure may to some degree be defended by adjusting the volatility estimate for
borrower asset values, but still represents a clear disconnection to the banking industry.
We find the deviations of the models illustrated in our findings section to be closely linked
to the discussion above. I.e. the NP model tends to display both greater RNPD and
credit spread for equal values of borrower risk parameters. Here we point to the effect of
an arbitrary time horizon, and the structure of zero-coupon bonds as driving the bank
risk artificially high in the NP model. This is especially supported by the appearance of
concavity displayed when borrower asset volatility increases, compared to convexity for
the AMP model. We also point to the effect of simulations compared to optimization, in
which a greater number of scenarios are accounted for in the NP model. We also discuss
the impact of capital market frictions within the AMP model, allowing the bank to reduce
both its RNPD and credit spread for a given set of borrower risk parameters, due to the
maximization of its trade-off function.
Lastly, we touch upon some common disconnections of structural credit models to the
present banking industry. We find that their lack of loan diversity, bank debt diversity,
bank income diversity and various borrower characteristics contributes to somewhat
distancing the models from today’s banks. However, we believe the models present
reasonable simplifications of such banks, and recognize the rather extreme complications
and impracticality of accurately accounting for the vast amount of details regarding the
banking industry.
54 References
References
Admati, A. R., DeMarzo, P. M., Hellwig, M. F., and Pfleider, P. (2013). Fallacies,
irrelevant facts, and myths in the discussion of capital regulation: Why bank equity is
not socially expensive. Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 23.
Atreya, N., Mjøs, A., and Persson, S.-A. (2019). Making bank: Why high bank leverage
is optimal - for the bank’s shareholders. Working paper.
Bhanot, K. and Guo, L. (2011). Negative credit spreads: Liquidity and limits to arbitrage.
The Journal of Fixed Income, 21:32–41.
BIS (2017). Basel iii: Finalising post-crisis reforms. https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424
.pdf.
Black, F. and Cox, j. C. (1976). Valuing corporate securities: Some effects of bond
indenture provisions. The Journal of Finance, 31:351–367.
Black, F. and Scholes, M. (1973). The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. The
Journal of Political Economy, 81:637–654.
Carvalho, C., Ferrero, A., and Nechio, F. (2017). Demographic Transition and Low U.S.
Interest Rates. https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter
/2017/september/demographic-transition-and-low-us-interest-rates/.
Cook, M. H. (2019). Norway’s banking sector: Facts & Figures. https://www.ebf.eu/nor
way/.
CreditMetrics (1997). Technical Document. J.P. Morgan & Co.
Davis, T. P. (2017). Mind your ps and qs: Real world vs. risk neutral probabilities.
Factset.
DeAngelo, H. and Stulz, R. M. (2015). Liquid-claim production, risk management, and
bank capital structure: Why high leverage is optimal for banks. Journal of Financial
Economics, 116:219–236.
Dermine, J. and Lajeri, F. (2001). Credit risk and the deposit insurance premium: a note.
The Journal of Economics and Business, 53:497–508.
Fama, E. F. (1970). Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work.
The Journal of Finance, 25:383–417.
Finansdepartementet (2019). Finansmarkedsmeldingen 2019. https://www.regjeringen.no
/no/dokumenter/meld.-st.-24-20182019/id2642702/sec1.
Finans Norge (2019). Bankstatistikk. https://www.finansnorge.no/statistikk/bank/.
Finanstilsynet (2017). Uvektet Kjernekapitalandel (leverage ratio). https://www.finanstil
synet.no/tema/kapitaldekning/uvektet-kjernekapitalandel-leverage-ratio/.
Ganti, A. (2019). Central Limit Theorem (CLT). https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c
/central_limit_theorem.asp.
Gornall, W. and Strebulaev, I. A. (2018). Financing as a supply chain: The capital
structure of banks and borrowers. The Journal of Financial Economics, 43:510–530.
References 55
Graham, R. L., Knuth, D. E., and Patashnik, O. (1994). Concrete Mathematics. Addison
Wesley Publishing Company.
Harrison, J. M. (1985). Brownian motion and stochastic flow systems. Wiley, New York.
IMF (2019). Real GDP growth. https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPC
H@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD/NOR.
Jarrow, R. A. and Protter, P. (2004). Structural versus reduced form models: A new
information based perspective. Journal of Investment Management, 2:1–10.
Keeley, M. C. (1990). Deposit insurance, risk, and market power in banking. The American
Economic Review, 80:1183–1200.
Lando, D. (2004). Credit Risk Modeling: Theory and Applications. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Leland, H. E. (1994). Corporate debt value, bond covenants, and optimal capital structure.
The Journal of Finance, 49:1213–1252.
Lexico (2019). Supremum/Infimum. https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/supremum.
Lindquist, K. G., Mundal, O. M. K., Riiser, M. D., and Solheim, H. (2016). Bankenes
etterspørsel og kredittpraksis siden 2008: Resultater fra norges banks utlånsundersøkelse.
Norges Bank, pages 5–16.
Lucas, D. (1995). Default correlation and credit analysis. The Journal of Fixed Income,
pages 76–87.
McAllister, J. and Mingo, J. (1996). Bank capital requirements for securitized loan pools.
The Journal of Banking and Finance, 20:1381–1405.
Merton, R. C. (1974). On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest
rates*. The Journal of Finance, 29:449–470.
Modigliani, F. and Miller, M. H. (1958). The cost of capital, corporate finance and the
theory of investment. The American economic review, 48:261–297.
Nagel, S. and Purnanandam, A. (2019). Bank risk dynamics and distance to default.
CESifo.
Norges Bank (2019a). Det Norske Finansielle Systemet. https://static.norges-bank.no/co
ntentassets/a49745f402d348e2bdaca87ff2614e23/dnfs_2019.pdf?v=06/21/201910072
6&ft=.pdf.
Norges Bank (2019b). Government bonds daily observations. https://www.norges-bank.
no/en/topics/Statistics/Interest-rates/Government-bonds-daily/.
Ritter, F. E., Schoelles, M. J., Quigley, K. S., and Klein, L. C. (2001). Determining the
Number of Simulation Runs: Treating Simulations as Theories by Not Sampling Their
Behavior. Springer, London.
Romo, J. M. (2014). Modeling credit spreads under multifactor stochastic volatility. The
Spanish Review of Financial Economics, 12:40–45.
Samuelson, P. A. (1965). Proof that properly anticipated prices fluctuate randomly.
Industrial Management Review.
56 References
SSB (2019a). Banker og kredittforetak. https://www.ssb.no/statbank/table/07880/.
SSB (2019b). Banker og kredittforetak. https://www.ssb.no/statbank/table/08113/.
Stoll, H. R. (1969). The relationship between put and call option prices. The Journal of
Finance, 24:801–824.
Sundaresan, S. M. and Wang, Z. (2014). Bank liability structure. Columbia Business
School.
Toto, A. (2016). Reduced-form and structural models of correlated defaults: two tales of
the same phenomenon.
Wang, Y. (2009). Structural credit risk modeling: Merton and beyond. Risk Management,
19:30–33.
57
Appendix
In this section we present each and every equation provided in the papers of NP and AMP.
We begin by introducing the parameters utilized in the models, followed by the respective
series of equations chronologically as in the paper.
A1 Nagel and Purnanandam model
A1.1 Parameter definitions
r -> risk-free rate
l -> borrower leverage ratio
σ -> borrower asset volatility
ρ -> borrower asset correlation
δ -> depreciation rate
γ -> payout level
A1.2 Model equations
Borrower asset value process
dAτ,it
Aτ,it
= (r − δ)dt+ σ(√ρdWt +
√
1− ρdZτ,it ). (.1)
Face value of borrower loan
F1(µ) = le
µT . (.2)
Payoff at maturity t = T − τ
Lτ,iT−τ (µ) = min[A
τ,i
T−τ , F1(µ)]. (.3)
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Borrower leverage for competitively priced loans
l = e−rTEQ−τ [L
τ,i
T−τ (µ)]. (.4)
Aggregate value of collateral in cohort τ
AτT−τ =
1
N
exp{(r − δ)T − 1
2
ρσ2T + σ
√
ρ(WT−τ −W−τ )}, (.5)
and its aggregate log asset value
aτT−τ =
1
N
[(r − δ)T − 1
2
σ2T + σ
√
ρ(WT−τ −W−τ )]. (.6)
Payoff at maturity received by bank
LτT−τ (µ) =
1
N
[AτT−τΦ{d1(µ)}+ F1(µ)Φ{d2(µ)}], (.7)
where
d1(µ) =
lnF1(µ)− aτT−τ√
1− ρ√Tσ −
√
1− ρ
√
Tσ, (.8)
and
d2(µ) = − lnF1(µ)− a
τ
T−τ√
1− ρ√Tσ . (.9)
New loans issued to borrowers at maturity
F2(µ) = L
τ
T−τe
µT . (.10)
Reset borrower asset value for new loans issued
Aτ,i(T−τ)+ =
LτT−τ
l
. (.11)
A1 Nagel and Purnanandam model 59
Payoff at maturity for new loans received by bank
Lτ2T−τ (µ) =
1
N
[Aτ2T−τΦ(d3) + F2(µ)Φ(d4)], (.12)
where
d3 =
lnF2(µ)− aτ2T−τ√
1− ρ√Tσ −
√
1− ρ
√
Tσ, (.13)
and
d4 = − lnF2(µ)− a
τ
2T−τ√
1− ρ√Tσ . (.14)
Aggregate value of banks loan portfolio at time t = H
VH =
∑
τ<H
e−r(τ+T−H)EQH [L
τ
2T−τ ] +
∑
τ>H
e−r(τ−H)EQH [L
τ
T−τ ]. (.15)
Bank payout at time t = H
YH = VH(1− e−γH). (.16)
Ex-dividend bank equity value at time t = H
SH = max[0, VH − YH −D]. (.17)
Bank debt value at time t = H
BH = VH − YH − SH . (.18)
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A2 Atreya, Mjøs and Persson model
A2.1 Parameter definitions
r -> continuos risk-free rate
L -> borrower leverage ratio
σ -> borrower asset volatility
θ -> bank income tax rate
α -> bankruptcy cost of the bank
A2.2 Model equations
Borrower asset value process
dAt
At
= rdt+ σdWt. (.19)
Borrower leverage at loan origination
L =
Bˆ
A0
. (.20)
Value of the borrower loan (Black and Cox, 1976)
B(At) =
cBˆ
r
− (cBˆ
r
− A¯)(At
A¯
)−γ, (.21)
where
γ =
2r
σ2
> 0. (.22)
Price of security paying 1 in the case of borrower default
Gt = (
At
A¯
)−γ. (.23)
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The process Gt using Itoˆ’s lemma
dGt
Gt
= rdt− σγdWt. (.24)
The borrower defaults at time τ(1), where
τ(1) = inf{t ≥ 0 : At = A¯} = inf{t ≥ 0 : Gt = 1}. (.25)
Borrower threshold value (Black and Cox, 1976)
A¯ = ΨBˆ, (.26)
where
Ψ =
c
r
γ
γ + 1
< 1. (.27)
Initial value of state price of the borrower’s default
G = G0 = (LΨ)
γ. (.28)
Assuming the loans are granted at par, the coupon rate (c) can be found from
c
r
(1− G
γ + 1
) = 1. (.29)
Expressing deterministic sequence of loan amounts to borrower j + 1
Bˆj+1 = A¯j = BΨj. (.30)
Bank asset value when the first borrower is solvent
Bt = B(At) =
cBˆ1
r
− (cBˆ
1
r
− A¯)(At
A¯
)−γ =
cBˆ1
r
(1− Gt
γ + 1
). (.31)
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Gt can be expressed by an arithmetic Brownian motion Yt with dynamics
dYt = vdt− dWt, (.32)
where
v =
r
σγ
− σγ
2
. (.33)
Gt can then be expressed by Yt as
Gt = Ge
σγYt , (.34)
where
d =
1
σγ
ln(
1
G
). (.35)
Default time of first borrower expressed by Yt
τ(1) = inf{t ≥ 0 : Gt = 1} = inf{t ≥ 0 : Yt = d}. (.36)
Default time of the banks borrower number n = 1, 2, ...
τ(n) = inf{t ≥ 0 : Gt = 1
Gn−1
} = inf{t ≥ 0 : Yt = n · d}. (.37)
By defining
ηt = sup
0≤s≤t
Ys, (.38)
the number of borrower defaults up to time t is
Nt = bηt/dc. (.39)
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State price of default of the borrower at time t
Πt = Ge
σγ(Yt−Ntd). (.40)
Face value of borrower loan at time t
Bˆt = BΨ
Nt . (.41)
Time t value of the bank’s asset
Bt =
c
r
BΨNt(1− Πt
γ + 1
). (.42)
The bank defaults at time
τB¯ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Bt = B¯}. (.43)
Minimum of the bank’s asset value up to time t
mt = inf
0≤s≤t
Bs. (.44)
Distribution of the bank’s default time
Q(τB¯ < t) = Q(mt < B¯). (.45)
The bank’s default probability (see Harrison,1985)
Q(mt < B¯) = Q(ηt > n¯ · d), (.46)
where
n¯ = n(B¯) = m¯+ 1− ln(G¯)
ln(G)
, (.47)
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and
m¯ = m(B¯) = max{n : BΨn > B¯} = b ln(B¯)− ln(B)
ln(Ψ)
c, (.48)
and
G¯ = (γ + 1)(1− r
c
B¯
BΨm¯
). (.49)
τB¯ has an inverse Gaussian (IG) distribution
τB¯ ∼ IG(
nB¯ · d
v
, (n¯ · d)2). (.50)
Time 0 value of the state price of the bank’s default
ΠB¯ = G
n¯. (.51)
State price of the bank’s default when L approaches 100%
lim
L↗1
ΠB¯ = (
B
B¯
)−γ. (.52)
Shareholders maximize time 0 value by solving
E(B) = sup
τ
E[
∫ τ
0
(cBΨNt − iF )e−rtdt], (.53)
which is solved by the following
n∗ = d ln(iF )− ln(cB)
lnΨ
e, (.54)
and
τ¯ ∗ = τ(n∗), (.55)
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and
E(B) = B − {iF
r
− (iF
r
− B¯∗)Gn∗}. (.56)
The bank’s optimal default threshold
B¯∗ = BΨn
∗
. (.57)
Time value 0 of the bank’s own debt
D(B) =
iF
r
− (iF
r
− B¯∗)Gn∗ . (.58)
Interest rate paid on the bank’s debt
i = r(
1− (GΨ)n
∗
LB
1−Gn∗ ), (.59)
where
LB =
F
B
. (.60)
Time 0 value of the tax benefit of the bank from debt financing
T (n¯) =
θiF
r
(1−Gn¯). (.61)
Time 0 value of the bankruptcy cost of the bank from debt financing
C(n¯) = αB¯Gn¯ = αB(ΨG)n¯. (.62)
Time 0 sum of the bank’s asset value and trade-off value
V (n¯) = B +X(n¯), (.63)
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where
X(n¯) = T (n¯)− C(n¯) = θiF
r
(1−Gn¯)− αB(ΨG)n¯. (.64)
Shareholders optimize the time 0 equity value for a given amount of bank leverage by
solving
Ef (B) = sup
τ
E[
∫ τ
0
(cBΨNt − (1− θ)iF )e−rtdt], (.65)
Which is solved by the following
n∗f = d
ln[(1− θ)iF ]− ln(cB)
lnΨ
e, (.66)
and
τ¯ ∗f = τ(n
∗
f ), (.67)
and
Ef (B) = B − {(1− θ)iF
r
− ((1− θ)iF
r
− B¯∗f )Gn
∗
f}, (.68)
where
B¯∗f = BΨ
n∗f . (.69)
The time 0 value of the bank’s payment to creditors before tax
iF
r
− (iF
r
− B¯∗f )Gn
∗
f . (.70)
The time 0 value of the bank’s tax deductions on interest payments
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T (n∗f ) =
θiF
r
(1−Gn∗f ). (.71)
Net time 0 value of the bank’s debt liability
Df (B) =
(1− θ)iF
r
− ((1− θ)iF
r
− B¯∗f )Gn
∗
f . (.72)
Net time 0 value of the bank’s debt liability in the perspective of creditors
Dcf (B) =
iF
r
− (iF
r
− (1− α)B¯∗f )Gn
∗
f . (.73)
Setting iF to maximum value for optimal enterprise value
(iF )∗ =
cBΨn
∗
f−1
1− θ . (.74)
Trade off as a function of the number of borrower defaults with repect to t ∈ R+
X(t) =
θ
r
cBΨ(t−1)
(1− θ) (1−Gt)− αB(ΨG)
t = BΨt(θK(1−Gt)− αGt), (.75)
where the constant
K =
γ + 1
γ(1− θ) > 1. (.76)
Optimal number of borrower defaults
n∗ = bt∗c+ 1{X}, (.77)
where
t∗ =
θKlnΨ
(θK+α)ln(ΨG)
lnG
, (.78)
and
68 A2 Atreya, Mjøs and Persson model
1{X} =
 1 ifX(bt∗c) > Xdt∗e)0 otherwise. (.79)
The bank’s optimal cash flow dedicated to debt service
(iF )∗ =
cBΨn
∗−1
1− θ = rKB¯
∗. (.80)
The value of the bank’s optimal debt
D(B)x =
(iF )∗
r
− ((iF )
∗
r
− (1− α)BΨn∗)Gn∗ . (.81)
The corresponding interest rate on bank debt
i =
r
1− (1− 1−α
K
)Gn∗
. (.82)
The optimum enterprise value of the bank
V (B)∗ = B +
θ(iF )∗
r
(1−Gn∗)− αB(ΨG)n∗ = B +X(n∗). (.83)
